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Recent Developments

Illinois v. Wardlow
An Individual's Presence in a High Crime Area Combined with Unprovoked Flight
after Seeing a Police Officer Is Sufficient Basis for Reasonable Suspicion
ByLeeA.Dix

T

he Supreme Court of the
United States, in a five to
four decision, held that there is
sufficient basis for a Terry stop when
an individual in a high crime area fiees,
without provocation, after noticing a
police presence. Illinois v. Wardlow,
120 S.Ct. 673 (2000). The Court
explained that for purposes of a Terry
stop, a "totality of the circumstances"
approach is applied to determine if
reasonable suspicion exists under the
circumstances. In so holding, the
Court stated that a determination of
reasonable suspicion requires
commonsense judgments and
inferences concerning human
behavior.
On September 9, 1995, four
police cars carrying a total of eight
Chicago Police Department officers
were converging on an area of the
city known for drug trafficking.
Officers Nolan and Harvey, in uniform,
were in the last car. Officer Nolan
observed the defendant ("Wardlow")
holding an opaque bag. Wardlow
looked in the direction of the officers
and,
without
provocation,
immediately began to run. Officers
Nolan and Harvey pursued Wardlow
and eventually overtook him. Upon
apprehension, Officer Nolan
immediately conducted a Terry frisk,
as it was common knowledge and
procedure to locate weapons in close
proximity to drug transactions. Upon

squeezing the bag Wardlow was
carrying, Officer Nolan felt a hard
object in the shape ofa gun and further
inspection revealed Wardlow was
carrying a loaded.38 caliber handgun.
The trial court denied
Wardlow's motion to suppress.
Subsequently, Wardlow was
convicted of unlawful possession of a
handgun by a felon. The appellate
court reversed, stating that reasonable
suspicion did not exist for Officer
Nolan to detain Wardlow. Inaffirming·
the decision, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that sudden flight in a high
crime area did not create reasonable
suspicion justifying a Terry stop
because flight is not determinative of
wrongdoing. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari solely to review the
question ofwhether the initial stop was
supported by reasonable suspicion.
The Court began its analysis by
stating that an individual's mere
presence in a high cnme area, without
more, does not rise to the level of
reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity is afoot. Wardlow, 120 S.Ct.
at 676. However, location is a factor
in determining ifreasonable suspicion
exists. Id. Furthermore, the Court
stated that officers should consider the
relevance oflocation along with other
factors to determine if further police
action is warranted. Id. In addition
to location, the Court explained that
a high crime area is a relevant

consideration in the Terry analysis.
[d. (citing Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143, 144 (1972)).
The Court next addressed
Wardlow's actual behavior after he
noticed the police. Id. The Court
stated that nervous and evasive
behavior of an individual is another
pertinent factor in determining
reasonable suspicion. Id. Noting
that flight is the ultimate act ofevasion,
the Court held that it is suggestive of
wrongdoing, but not indicative. [d.
The Court opined that "the
determination of reasonable suspicion
must be based on commonsense
judgments and inferences about
human behavior." [d. Applying this
totality of the circumstances
approach, the Court concluded that
Wardlow's detention was based on
reasonable suspicion that he was
involved in illegal activities. Id.
Aware of the potential conflict
with prior decisions, the Court
reconciled its holding in Wardlow
with the Bostick v. Florida holding
that "refusal to cooperate, without
more, does not furnish the minimal
level ofobjective justification needed
for detention or seizure." Id. (quoting
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,
437 (1991)). The Court opined that
a Terry stop is a minimal intrusion on
an individual's Fourth Amendment
rights, and that police officers may
stop innocent people. However, if
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probable cause does not arise during
a Terry stop, the individual is free to
go. Id. at 677. The Court also
addressed its holding in Royer v.
Florida, that an individual has a right
to go about his business ifapproached
by an officer lacking the requisite
reasonable suspicion or probable
cause. Id. at 676 (citing Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)). The
Court, however, reasoned that
unprovoked flight is more than a
refusal to cooperate and is not merely
going about one's business. Id.
Four justices concurred in part
and dissented in part. The justices
concurred with the majority in
adopting a totality of the
circumstances approach to
determining reasonable suspicion.
However, they rejected a "bright-linerule," allowing the detention of an
individual who flees after seeing a
police officer. Id. Furthermore, the
concurringjustices stated that some
minorities, particularly those in high
crime areas, believe contact with
police officers can be dangerous,
which provides a completely innocent
explanation for fleeing. Id. at 680.
The dissent rejected the majority
holding that flight occurring in a high
crime area is sufficient justification for
reasonable suspicion. Id. 683-84.
They emphasized that many factors
providing innocent reasons for
unprovoked flight are concentrated in
high crime areas. Id. at 684. Flight
and the high crime area factor, the
dissent stated, are both too
susceptible to innocent interpretation
to form the basis for reasonable
suspicion. Id. at 678-80.
With this decision, the Supreme
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Court gives police officers broad
discretion to stop individuals,
specifically minorities and the poor, in
high crime areas for behavior that may
be overlooked in a different
community. This decision creates a
two-tier system ofFourth Amendment
rights and may contribute to increased
harassment of minorities and the less
fortunate by police officers. The
likelihood that evidence seized during
a Terry stop will be suppressed is
significantly decreased by this
decision. Defense attorneys face a
substantial hurdle to defeat the validity
of the Terry stop if their client is
stopped after running in a high crime
area. As a result of this holding,
prosecutors are merely required to
argue that the individual attempted to
flee instead of the individual's intent
to engage in criminal activity.
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